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This paper empirically assesses competing theoretical views on a century old policy debate: Are 
bank-based or market-based financial systems better for promoting long-run economic growth?  Since the 
19
th century, many economists have argued that bank-based systems are better at mobilizing savings, 
identifying good investments, and exerting sound corporate control, particularly during the early stages of 
economic development and in weak institutional environments.  Others, however, emphasize the 
advantages of markets in allocating capital, providing risk management tools, and mitigating the problems 
associated with excessively powerful banks.  Economists have constructed a vast number of theoretical 
insights into the comparative advantages of different financial systems.
1  Reflecting these schisms, 
policymakers continue to struggle with the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial 
systems in making policy decisions.  Thus, the objective of this paper is to produce empirical evidence 
that (1) distinguishes among competing theories and  (2) helps policy makers design appropriate financial 
sector reform strategies.   
Empirical research on the comparative merits of bank-based and market-based financial systems 
has centered on Germany and Japan as bank-based systems and the United States and the United 
Kingdom as market-based systems.
2  This work has produced illuminating insights into the functioning of 
these financial systems.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about the long-run growth 
effects of bank-based and market-based financial systems based on only four countries, especially four 
countries that have very similar long-run growth rates.   Although these countries together account for 
over 50 percent of world output and although there are decades during which their growth rates diverged 
substantially, broadening the analysis to a wider array of national experiences will provide greater 
information on the bank-based versus market-based debate.  Consequently, this paper constructs a new 
dataset to investigate the relationship between economic growth and the degree to which countries are 
bank-based or market-based.   2
In conducting the first, broad cross-country study of financial structure and economic growth, this 
paper provides empirical evidence on competing theories of financial structure.  The bank-based view 
highlights the positive role of banks in (i) acquiring information about firms and managers and thereby 
improving capital allocation and corporate governance (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 
1984), (ii) managing cross-sectional, intertemporal, and liquidity risk and thereby enhancing investment 
efficiency and economic growth (Allen and Gale, 1999; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991), and (iii) 
mobilizing capital to exploit economies of scale (Sirri and Tufano, 1995).  The bank-based view also 
stresses the shortcomings of market-based systems.  Stiglitz (1985), for instance, argues that well-
developed markets quickly and publicly reveal information, which reduces the incentives for individual 
investors to acquire information.  Banks, however, mitigate this problem since they form long-run 
relationships with firms and do not reveal information immediately in public markets (Boot, Greenbaum, 
and Thakor, 1993).  Also, Boot and Thakor (1997) argue that banks – as coordinated coalitions of 
investors – are better than uncoordinated markets at monitoring firms and reducing post-lending moral 
hazard (asset substitution).  Proponents of the bank-based view also stress that liquid markets create a 
myopic investor climate (Bhide 1993).  In liquid markets, investors can inexpensively sell their shares, so 
that they have fewer incentives to exert rigorous corporate control.  Thus, according to the bank-base 
view, greater market development may hinder corporate control and economic growth.  Furthermore, 
Gerschenkron (1962) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) stress that powerful banks can more effectively force 
firms to re-pay their debts than atomistic markets, especially in countries with weak contract enforcement 
capabilities.  Without powerful banks to force repayment, therefore, external investors may be reluctant to 
finance industrial expansion in countries with underdeveloped institutions.  Thus, the bank-based view 
holds that banks -- unhampered by regulatory restrictions on their activities -- can exploit scale economies 
in information processing, ameliorate moral hazard through effective monitoring, form long-run 
relationships with firms to ease asymmetric information distortions, and thereby boost economic growth. 
In contrast, the market-based view highlights the growth enhancing role of well-functioning 
markets in (i) fostering greater incentives to research firms since it is easier to profit from this information   3
by trading in big, liquid markets (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993), (ii) enhancing corporate governance by 
easing takeovers and making it easier to tie managerial compensation to firm performance (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), and (iii) facilitating risk management (Levine, 1991; Obstfeld, 1994).  Moreover, the 
market-based view stresses problems with banks.  Specifically, powerful banks can stymie innovation by 
extracting informational rents and protecting established firms with close bank-firm ties from competition 
(Hellwig, 1991; Rajan, 1992).  Furthermore, powerful banks with few regulatory restrictions on their 
activities may collude with firm managers against other creditors and impede efficient corporate 
governance (Hellwig, 1998; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998).  In contrast, competitive capital markets play a 
positive role in aggregating diffuse information signals and effectively transmitting this information to 
investors, with beneficial implications for firm financing and economic performance (Boot and Thakor, 
1997; Allen and Gale, 1999).  Thus, proponents of the market-based view stress that markets will reduce 
the inherent inefficiencies associated with banks and enhance economic growth.
3 
The financial services view -- as articulated by Merton and Bodie (1995) and Levine (1997) –
minimizes the importance of the bank-based versus market-based debate.  It stresses that financial 
arrangements – contracts, markets, and intermediaries – arise to ameliorate market imperfections and 
provide financial services.  That is, financial arrangements arise to assess potential investment 
opportunities, exert corporate control, facilitate risk management, enhance liquidity, and ease savings 
mobilization.  By providing these financial services more or less effectively, different financial systems 
promote economic growth to a greater or lesser degree.  According to this view, the main issue is not 
banks or markets.  The issue is creating an environment in which intermediaries and markets provide 
sound financial services.  Conceptually, the financial services view is fully consistent with both the bank-
based and market-based views.  Nevertheless, the financial services view places the analytical spotlight 
on how to create better functioning banks and markets, and relegates the bank-based versus market-based 
debate to the shadows. 
A special case of the financial-services view when applied to the bank-based versus market-based 
debate is the law and finance view (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, henceforth LLSV,   4
1998).  As stated by LLSV (2000, p. 19),  “… bank- versus market-centeredness is not an especially 
useful way to distinguish financial systems.”   Rather, these authors highlight the role of the legal system 
in creating a growth-promoting financial sector. The law and finance view argues that finance is a set of 
contracts.  These contracts are defined – and made more or less effective – by legal rights and 
enforcement mechanisms.  From this perspective, a well-functioning legal system facilitates the operation 
of both markets and intermediaries.  It is the overall level and quality of financial services – as determined 
by the legal system – that improves the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth.     While 
focusing on legal systems is not inconsistent with banks or markets playing a particularly important role 
in stimulating economic growth, LLSV (2000) clearly argue that laws and enforcement mechanisms are a 
more useful way to distinguish financial systems than focusing on whether countries are bank-based of 
market-based. 
An important contribution of this paper is the construction of a broad cross-country dataset to 
examine market- and bank-based financial systems.   Past empirical research primarily involves rigorous 
country-studies and uses country-specific measures of financial structure.  Thus, studies of Germany 
commonly focus on the extent to which banks own shares or vote proxy shares.  Studies of Japan 
frequently focus on whether a company has a “main bank.”  Studies of the United States sometimes 
concentrate on the role of market takeovers as corporate control devices.  These country-specific 
measures are very useful; however, they are difficult to use in a broad cross-country analysis.  This paper 
uses data from individual country publications, international agencies, and a recent survey of national 
regulatory authorities to measure financial structure.  One advantage of the broad cross-country approach 
is that it permits a consistent treatment of financial system structure across many countries.
 4  Second, the 
cross-country approach circumvents the problem noted earlier: if one accepts that Germany and Japan are 
bank-based and that the United States and the United Kingdom are market-based, then this implies that 
financial structure did not matter much since the four countries have very similar long-run growth rates.
5  
This paper incorporates countries with very different financial systems and growth rates.  The dataset 
measures the size, activity, and efficiency of various components of the financial system, including banks,   5
securities markets, and nonbank financial intermediaries for a wide assortment of developed and 
developing countries.  The paper also measures financial structure by using new data on regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities and the ability of banks to own and control firms.  While recognizing that 
broad cross-country comparisons come at the cost of less precise measures of financial structure, this 
paper provides the first consistent appraisal of financial structure and economic performance in the 
international cross-section of countries. 
The results are overwhelming.  There is no cross-country empirical support for either the market-
based or bank-based views.  Neither bank-based nor market-based financial systems are particularly 
effective at promoting growth. The results are robust to an extensive array of sensitivity analyses that 
employ different measures of financial structure, alternative statistical procedures, and different datasets.  
The conclusions are also not altered when looking at extremes: countries with very well developed banks 
but poorly developed markets do not perform notably differently from those with very well developed 
markets but poorly developed banks, or than those with more balanced financial systems. I also allow for 
the possibility that financial structure changes as countries develop and legal systems evolve.  For 
instance, Boyd and Smith (1998) develop a model in which countries become more market-based, with 
positive implications for economic growth, as they develop.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that bank-
based systems are better at promoting growth in countries with poor legal systems, while market-based 
systems have advantages as legal systems improve.  Allowing for these possibilities, however, does not 
alter this paper’s conclusion: cross-country comparisons do not suggest that distinguishing between bank-
based and market-based is analytically useful for understanding the process of economic growth. 
The cross-country evidence is consistent with the financial services view.  Better-developed 
financial systems positively influence economic growth.  It is relatively unimportant for economic 
growth, however, whether overall financial development stems from bank or market development.  More 
particularly, the data are consistent with the view that the legal system plays a leading role in determining 
the level of growth-promoting financial services.  The component of financial development defined by the 
legal rights of investors and the efficiency of contract enforcement is very strongly associated with   6
growth.  Thus, the data tend to support the LLSV (1999) view that (i) the legal system crucially 
determines financial development and (ii) financial structure is not a particularly useful way to distinguish 
financial systems.  The results do not support public policies aimed at creating a particular mixture of 
financial markets and intermediaries.  Rather, the results highlight the importance of strengthening the 
rights of investors and improving the efficiency of contact enforcement.  While there are difficulties in 
measuring financial structure, this paper uses an exhaustive number of indicators that all tell the same 
story: it is less useful to distinguish financial systems by whether they are bank-based or market-based 
than it is to focus on the specific laws and enforcement mechanisms that govern both debt and equity 
transactions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents the econometric 
specification and the data are discussed in Section III.  Section IV provides the regression results and 
Section V conclusions 
   7
II. Econometric  Specification 
The bank-based, market-based, financial services, and law and finance views of financial 
structure can be represented as rival predictions on the parameters in a standard growth equation.  
Standard growth models and their econometric representations typically model real per capita GDP 
growth, G, as a function of a number of growth determinants, X.  These growth determinants universally 
include initial income and the initial level of workforce education to capture conditional convergence and 
the importance of human capital.  Many models also control for macroeconomic stability, openness to 
international trade, and political stability.  I modify these cross-country growth specifications to 
investigate econometrically the competing views of financial structure.   
Consider the following cross-country regression equations 
G =  a’X  + bS + U(1)                                                                                                              (1) 
G =  c’X  + dF + U(2)                                                                                                              (2) 
G =  f’X  + hS + jF + U(3)                                                                                                       (3) 
G is real per capita GDP growth.   
X is a set of conditioning information, i.e., standard growth determinants.  
S measures financial structure.  Larger values of S signify more market-based, while smaller values 
signify more bank-based. 
F measures overall financial sector development, i.e., the level of development of banks, nonbanks, and 
securities markets.  Larger values of F signify a greater level of financial services. 
U(i) is the error term in equation i=1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
The small letters, a, b, c, d, f, h, and j are coefficients. 
 
  Different hypotheses regarding financial structure and growth imply different predictions on the 
values of the parameters in regressions (1)-(3). 
Bank-based view: Bank-based systems are particularly good for growth and banks contribute to overall 
financial development.  Thus, the bank-based view predicts that b<0, d>0, h<0, and j>0.  This is a narrow 
conception of the bank-based view.  A broader approach is explained and tested below 
Market-based view: Market-based systems are particularly good for growth and markets contribute to 
overall financial development.  Thus, the market-based view predicts that b>0, d>0, h>0, and j>0.   8
Financial-services view: Financial services – whether provided by bank or markets -- positively influence 
growth.  Thus, the financial-services view predicts that d>0, and j>0. 
Law and finance view: The law and finance view is a special case of the financial-services view.  It 
predicts that the component of overall financial development defined by the legal system is critical for 
long-run economic growth, but having a bank-based or market-based financial system per se is not critical 
for growth. Moreover, the law and finance view predicts that the legal system matters primarily by 
influencing overall financial sector performance.  To assess the law and finance view, I use instrumental 
variables to extract that component of overall financial development, F, defined by the legal rights of 
outside investors and the efficiency of contract enforcement.  Then, I assess whether this component of 
financial development is robustly linked with economic growth.  I also examine whether the legal system 
variables directly explain growth and whether they explain growth beyond their ability to explain cross-
country differences in F, overall financial development.  Econometrically, the law and finance view 
makes the same predictions as the financial-services view, except within the context of a regression 
framework that uses the legal codes and enforcement efficiency variables as instruments. 
Hybrid views:   An important set of views on the market-based and bank-based debate argue that banks 
are important for growth under some conditions while markets are more important under alternative 
conditions. 
  First, Boyd and Smith (1998) suggest that banks are particularly important at low levels of 
economic development.  As income rises, however, countries benefit from becoming more market-based.  
This view suggests that the regression should be specified as follows, where Y is real per capita GDP. 
G =  a’X  + bS + kS*Y + U(4)                                                                                                      (4) 
This view predicts that b<0 and k>0.  I consider this below. 
  Second, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that bank-based systems have a comparative 
advantage in economies with weak legal systems.  In those countries with weak institutions, powerful 
banks can still force firms to reveal information and pay their debts.  According to this view, economies 
will benefit from becoming more market-based only as their legal system capabilities strengthen.   This   9
view suggests that the regression should be specified as follows, where L is an index of legal system 
development. 
G =  a’X  + bS + kS*L + U(5)                                                                                                     (5) 
This view predicts that b<0 and k>0.  I consider this below. 
 
III. Data   
A.  Definitions of Financial Structure 
  To examine the relationship between financial structure and growth, one needs a measure of 
financial structure.  Unfortunately, there is no uniformly accepted definition of a bank-based or market-
based financial system.  Consequently, I construct an assortment of measures for 48 countries over the 
1980-95 period.  All of these data are available on request.  This is the largest set of countries for which I 
could get complete data.  Most of the analyses involve pure cross-sectional analyses with one observation 
per country.  The data appendix provides details. 
One advantage of the broad cross-country approach is that it permits a consistent treatment of 
financial system structure across countries and thereby facilitates international comparisons.  One 
weakness of the broad cross-country approach is that it does not permit the use of indicators such as the 
voting power of banks or the role of market takeovers as corporate control devices.  These types of 
measures are not available for the cross-section of countries. To provide a broad cross-country approach, 
therefore, this paper focuses on four aggregate indicators of financial structure based on measures of the 
relative size, activity, and efficiency of banks and markets.  I also use a measure of financial structure 
based on regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks.  In considering the development of markets, I 
focus on stock markets because the International Finance Corporate collects accurate, consistent data for a 
broad cross-section of countries.  I consider a wide array of alternative measures that I discuss below.  
  STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY is a measure of the activity of stock markets relative to that of 
banks.  To measure the activity of stock markets, I use the total value traded ratio, which equals the value 
of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges divided by GDP.  This total value traded ratio is   10
frequently used to gauge market liquidity because it measures market trading relative to economic 
activity. To measure the activity of banks, I use the bank credit ratio, which equals the value of deposit 
money bank credits to the private sector as a share of GDP.  Bank credit includes all deposit taking 
institutions as recognized by the International Monetary Fund. This measure excludes credits to the public 
sector (central and local governments as well as public enterprises). Thus, STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY 
equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by the bank credit ratio.  Larger values of 
STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY imply a more market-based financial system.  The values for STRUCTURE-
ACTIVITY are ranked and listed in Table I.  I discuss these values below. 
  STRUCTURE-SIZE is a measure of the size of stock markets relative to that of banks.  To 
measure the size of the domestic stock market, I use the market capitalization ratio, which equals the 
value of domestic equities listed on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. To measure the size of bank, I 
again use the bank credit ratio.  It should be noted, however, that other measures of banking system size, 
such as the total banking system assets divided by GDP, yield similar results.  Thus, STRUCTURE-SIZE 
equals the logarithm of the market capitalization ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. The values for 
STRUCTURE-SIZE are ranked and listed in Table I.  I discuss these values below. 
  STRUCTURE-EFFICIENCY is a measure of the efficiency of stock markets relative to that of 
banks.  To measure the efficiency of stock markets, I use the total value traded ratio since it reflects the 
liquidity of the domestic stock market.  I also used the turnover ratio, which equals the value of stock 
transactions relative to market capitalization.  The turnover ratio measures trading relative to the size of 
the markets and is also used as an indicator of market efficiency.  Using the turnover ratio produces 
similar results to those obtained with the total value traded ratio.  To measure the efficiency of the 
banking sector, I use overhead costs, which equals the overhead costs of the banking system relative to 
banking system assets.  Large overhead costs may reflect inefficiencies in the banking system.  There are 
potential problems with this measure, however.  Overhead costs may capture efficient investments in 
banking, not inefficiencies.  While many readers may question the accuracy of this index, I include it for 
completeness. I also used interest rate margins in place of overhead costs and obtained similar results.    11
Thus, STRUCTURE-EFFICIENCY equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times overhead 
costs.  Larger values of STRUCTURE-EFFICIENCY imply a more market-based financial system.  Its 
value is given in Table I. 
  STRUCTURE-AGGREGATE is a conglomerate measure of financial structure based on 
activity, size, and efficiency.  Specifically STRUCTURE-AGGREGATE is the first principal component 
of STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY, STRUCTURE-SIZE, and STRUCTURE-EFFICIENCY.  Thus, I construct 
STRUCTURE-AGGREGATE to be the variable that best explains (highest joint R-square) the first three 
financial structure indicators.  The ranked values of this variable are also given in Table I. 
STRUCTURE-REGULATORY is an aggregate measure of regulatory restrictions on 
commercial bank activities.  Based on a two-year survey of national regulatory authorities, I have 
information on the degree to which national regulatory authorities allow commercial banks to engage in 
securities (securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), 
insurance (insurance underwriting and selling), or real estate (real estate investment, development, and 
management) activities and the extent to which banks can own and control nonfinancial firms.
6  
Specifically, for the three regulatory categories on activities, I assign four possible values: 1 if the activity 
is unrestricted (A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the 
commercial bank); 2 if the activity is permitted (a full range of activities can be conducted, but all or 
some must be conducted in subsidiaries); 3 if the activity is restricted (less than a full range of activities 
can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries); and 4 if the activity is prohibited in the bank or 
subsidiaries.  In terms of banks owning nonfinancial firms, this variable takes on the value 1 if ownership 
is unrestricted (bank may own 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm), 2 if ownership is permitted 
(bank may own 100% of the equity in a nonfinancial firm, but ownership is limited based on a bank’s 
equity capital.), 3 if ownership is restricted (bank can only acquire less than 100% of the equity in a 
nonfinancial firm), and 4 if commercial bank ownership of nonfinancial firms is prohibited   12
Table I lists values of STRUCTURE-REGULATORY, which is the summation of each of these 
four indicators of regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities.  I have examined each of the 
individual indicators and they produce the same conclusions as the aggregate index.   
 
B.  Discussion of Financial Structure Measures 
The financial structure measures, especially the STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY indicator, produce 
intuitively appealing classifications of national financial systems, though it is important to highlight 
potential anomalies. The activity measure of financial structure, STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY, makes the 
intuitively attractive classification that Taiwan, Malaysia, Switzerland, and the United States are highly 
market-based because of their active markets.  However, STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY also identifies 
Turkey, Mexico, and Brazil as very market-based even though their total value traded ratios are about 
one-sixth that of the United States.  This reflects the fact that these countries all have extremely low levels 
of bank development.   
The size measure of financial structure suffers from a large array of anomalies.  The size measure 
of financial structure, STRUCTURE-SIZE, identifies Ghana, Jamaica, and Zimbabwe as having highly 
market-based financial systems.   It does this because these countries have very small and under-
developed banking systems, not because their stock markets are particularly well developed. The size 
measure also classifies Egypt and Honduras as highly bank-based, even though they have bank credit 
ratios below the sample mean.  The size measure also indicates that Chile and South Africa are very 
market-based even though neither country has a very active market.  Both countries have large market 
capitalization with relatively little trading. Many theories, however, focuses on market liquidity, not the 
listing of shares per se.   Moreover, those models that emphasize the positive role of market size in 
disseminating and aggregating information presume the existence of a liquid market.  Thus, the size 
measure seems particularly prone to problems.   
STRUCTURE-EFFICIENCY identifies Switzerland, Taiwan, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom as market-based.  It also indicates that Brazil has a relatively efficient market.  Brazil has a high   13
value of STRUCTURE-EFFICIENCY because it has very large bank overhead costs.  Similarly, Egypt, 
Kenya, and Ghana standout as bank-based according to this efficiency measure, because they have very 
inefficient stock markets, not because they have efficient banks. 
The STRUCTURE-REGULATORY variable provides a reasonably intuitive classification of 
countries.  Some countries that are frequently classified as bank-based -- such as Austria, Germany, 
Switzerland, and France  -- place very few restrictions on the activities of banks.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand also permit banks great latitude in securities activities, insurance 
activities, real estate activities, and in owning nonfinancial firms.  In turn, the quintessential market-based 
economy, United States, imposed comparatively tight regulations on banks (prior to recent legislative 
changes).  While STRUCTURE-REGULATORY is not highly correlated with the other financial 
structure indicators, we include it for completeness and to assess whether regulations on bank activities 
influence economic growth. 
As exemplified, the activity, size, and efficiency financial structure measures can be large either 
because the country has well-developed markets, or because it has very poorly developed banks.  
Similarly, a country may have small financial structure indicators either because its banks are 
comparatively well-developed or because its markets are relatively underdeveloped.  To assess whether 
this feature of the data is driving the results, I also identify countries with highly underdeveloped financial 
systems.  Specifically, I identify those counties that have below median values of bank credit, market 
capitalization, and total value traded ratios and greater than median values of overhead expenditures.  I 
create a dummy variable called UNDEVELOPED, which equals 1 if the country has below median values 
of all of these financial development indicators.  Thus, rather than classifying countries as either bank-
based or market-based, I first identify those countries with highly underdeveloped financial systems.
7  As 
a robustness check, I test whether controlling for these countries in the regressions alters the findings and 
find that the findings are unaltered.
8   
The paper uses the best available data to assess the relationship between financial structure and 
economic growth.   Although these indicators do not directly measure the degree to which bank influence   14
industrial expansion or the ability of markets to fund innovative companies and facilitate risk 
management, the structure indicators – when taken together – provide a measure of the comparative role 
of banks and markets in the economy.  As further evidence of the usefulness of these measures, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) show that countries with strong shareholder rights relative to creditor 
rights, strong accounting systems, and no deposit insurance tend to have more market-based financial 
systems.  Thus, key legal and regulatory differences match-up with these financial structure measures.  
Furthermore, many of the individual components of the financial structure indicators (e.g., the bank credit 
and total value traded ratios) are robustly linked with growth and this link is not due to simultaneity or 
omitted variables bias (See Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000; and Beck and 
Levine, 2002).  Thus, I use these indicators to assess the relationship between economic performance and 
the degree to which countries are bank-based or market-based.   
C. Measuring Overall Financial Development 
  The financial services views suggest that neither market-based nor bank-based categorizations are 
particularly important for identifying growth-enhancing financial systems. This section presents measures 
of overall financial sector development based on indicators of activity, size, and efficiency.  The goal is 
that these indicators proxy for the degree to which national financial systems provide financial services: 
assessing firms and monitoring managers, easing risk management, and mobilizing resources.  Table II 
lists these data. 
  FINANCE-ACTIVITY is a measure of the activity of stock markets and intermediaries.  To 
measure the activity of stock markets, I use the total value traded ratio.  To measure the activity of banks, 
I use the private credit ratio, which equals the value of financial intermediary credits to the private sector 
as a share of GDP.  This measure excludes credits to the public sector (central and local governments as 
well as public enterprises).  Unlike the bank credit ratio used to construct STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY, 
however, the private credit ratio includes credits issued by non-deposit money banks.  Thus, it is a more 
comprehensive measure of financial intermediary development than private credit. This is appropriate 
since FINANCE-ACTIVITY is an overall index of financial sector activity.  (Note, however, that when I   15
reconstruct all the structure measures using private credit instead of bank credit, this does not change the 
results.)  Thus, FINANCE-ACTIVITY equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times the 
private credit ratio.  Also, Table III shows that FINANCE-ACTIVITY is significantly and positively 
correlated with each of the structure indicators and the other financial development indicators. 
  FINANCE-SIZE is a measure of the size of stock markets and intermediaries.  To measure the 
size of the domestic stock market, I use the market capitalization ratio.  As noted above, there are 
conceptual problems with simply using market size to gauge market development.  Also, Levine and 
Zervos (1998) find that market size is not strongly linked with economic growth but market activity (as 
measured by the total value traded ratio) is a good predictor of economic growth.  Nonetheless, we 
include this measure for completeness and to assess the Levine and Zervos (1998) finding with a different 
dataset.  To measure the size of intermediaries, I again use the private credit ratio. Thus, FINANCE-SIZE 
equals the logarithm of the market capitalization ratio times the private credit ratio. 
  FINANCE-EFFICIENCY is a measure of financial sector efficiency.  To measure the efficiency 
of stock markets, I use the total value traded ratio.  To measure the efficiency of the banking sector, I use 
overhead costs, which equals the overhead costs of the banking system relative to banking system assets. 
Thus, FINANCE-EFFICIENCY equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by overhead 
costs.   
  FINANCE-AGGREGATE is the first principal component of the first three financial 
development indicators of activity, size, and efficiency. 
B. Other  Variables 
To assess the independent relationship between growth and both financial structure and financial 
development, I control for other potential growth determinants (X in equations (1)-(5)).  I use two sets of 
conditioning information. 
The simple conditioning information set contains only the logarithm of initial real per capita 
GDP, which for the present study is the value in 1980, and the logarithm of the initial level of the number 
of years of schooling in the working age population.  Initial income captures the convergence effect   16
predicted by many growth models and schooling is included because many analyses suggest a positive 
role for human capital in the growth process. 
The full conditioning information set contains the simple conditioning information set plus (i) 
the logarithm of one plus the average rate of inflation, (ii) the logarithm of one plus the average black 
market premium, (iii) the logarithm of government size as a share of GDP, (iv) the logarithm of 
international trade (exports plus imports) as a share of GDP, and (v) indicators of civil liberties, 
revolutions and coups, political assassinations, bureaucratic efficiency, and corruption.  An assortment of 
research papers stresses the importance of macroeconomic policies and political factors in the process of 
economic growth.  I control for these factors in order to assess the independent link between growth and 




A. Financial Structure 
Table IV presents the financial structure results using ordinary least squares estimation with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.   The top panel lists the results for the simple conditioning 
information set for each of the five financial structure variables.  The bottom panel lists the results for the 
full conditioning information set.  I use a common sample throughout, so that there are 48 observations in 
all of the regressions (except as noted below).  To concisely summarize a large number of regressions, I 
only report the results on the variable of interest: the financial structure variables. 
Financial structure is not significantly related to economic growth.  None of the financial 
structure indicators enters any of the growth regressions significantly at the 0.10 level.  The results are 
inconsistent with both the bank-based and the market-based views.  The bank-based view predicts a 
negative relationship between growth and the financial structure measures.  The market-based view 
predicts a positive relationship.  Rather, the results are more consistent with the financial services and law 
and finance views: they predict that financial structure is not the most useful way to distinguish financial 
systems.
10  Furthermore, I modified the econometric specification to include both financial structure and   17
overall financial development.  The financial structure variables never enter the growth regression 
significantly.  However, overall financial development is robustly linked with economic growth as 
discussed below.
11 
Finally, I assess the broad views of financial structure and economic growth that involve a bit 
more nuance. That is, Table V presents the results of estimating equations (4) and (5), in order to mitigate 
potential interpretational complexities and evaluate the predictions of an important set of models. As 
noted, Boyd and Smith (1998) argue that the optimal degree level of financial structure changes with 
income per capita. Rajan and Zingales (1998) instead argue that in countries with weak shareholder 
protection codes and poorly enforced property rights, bank-based systems will better promote growth, 
while economies benefit from more market-based systems as the legal system improves.  
The results do not suggest that distinguishing countries as bank-based or market-based is an 
analytically useful way of distinguishing financial systems, even after allowing for the systematic 
evolution of financial structure (Table V). The first set of regressions (structure and income per capita) 
include the interaction term, S*Y, where S is the financial structure indicator and Y is real per capita 
GDP. As shown, neither the structure variable nor the interactive term enters significantly.  The second 
set of regressions (structure and shareholder rights) includes the index of the legal rights of (equity) 
shareholders independently and interacted with financial structure (S).
12  This does not change the 
conclusions.  None of the variables associated with financial structure enters significantly.  The third set 
of regressions (structure and the rule of law) includes an index of the degree to which the country follows 
the rule of law, LAW.
 13  This is included independently and interacted with financial structure. Again, 
there is no evidence that financial structure is a useful way to distinguish financial systems in assessing 
long-run growth.  Finally, I simply split the sample according to the level of economic development and 
analyzed OECD and non-OECD countries.  Financial structure does not enter significantly in any of these 
regressions either.  These results do not reject the theories outlined by Boyd and Smith (1998) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1998).  These findings do, however, suggest that the absence of a link between growth and   18
the level of bank-basedness or market-basedness is not due to countries selecting the optimal level of 
financial structure. 
B. Sensitivity of the Financial Structure Results 
While many of the robustness tests are detailed above, I explain a few additional ones here.   
First, I use instrumental variables to control for potential simultaneity.  I use three instrumental 
variables that explain cross-country differences in financial structure.  All three variables come from 
LLSV (1998).  The index of shareholder rights (defined above) does a particularly good job of explaining 
cross-country differences in stock market development.  In turn, the LLSV index of creditor rights helps 
account for cross-country differences in banking sector development.
14   The creditor rights index, 
however, does not explain much of the cross-country variation in stock market development.  Since 
contract enforcement is important for both bank and market activities, I also include a measure of the law 
and order tradition of the country, LAW.  Use of these instruments does not alter the results: financial 
structure is neither positively nor negatively related to economic growth.  Alternative instruments tell the 
same story. I use legal origin to extract the exogenous component of financial structure.  LLSV (1998) 
show the Common Law countries tend to have stronger investor protection laws and enforcement 
capabilities than French Civil Law countries.  Using these alternative instruments, however, does not alter 
the results.
15 
Second, the results in this paper have been checked using an alternative statistical procedure that (i) 
exploits the time-series (as well as the cross-country) dimension of the data, (ii) controls for the 
possibility that there is an important country-specific variable inducing omitted variable bias, and (iii) 
accounts for the possibility that financial structure and economic growth are simultaneously determined 
variables.  Specifically, instead of conducting the analyses using a pure cross-country estimator with one 
observation per country, I use pooled cross-section, time-series procedures.  The panel estimates, 
however, produce exactly the same results: while overall financial development is an important 
determinant of growth, financial structure is not systematically linked with economic performance.
 16   19
Finally, microeconomic evidence from individual country studies supports this paper’s findings.  
For instance, Gallego and Loayza (2001) investigate the development of Chile’s financial system over the 
last two decades using firm-level data and panel econometric techniques.  They find that changes in 
financial structure did not influence the cost of capital in Chile or firms’ access to capital.  However, they 
do find that overall financial development lowered the cost of capital and eased financing constraints.  
Furthermore, using firm-level data from a cross-section of 33 countries, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine 
and Maksimovic (2001) find that overall financial development boosts firm growth, but financial structure 
is unrelated to firm performance.  Finally, using industry level data across 42 countries, Beck and Levine 
(2002) find that while overall financial development boosts industry growth and new firm formation, 
having a bank-based or market-based financial system does not matter much. 
 
C. Financial Development 
The results are quite different when examining overall financial development.  Past work has 
demonstrated a strong link between financial development and growth.  Here, I show that the measures of 
overall financial development used in this paper are strongly linked with long-run growth and this 
relationship is not due to simultaneity bias.   
  Financial development – as measured by the conglomerate indices of bank activity and stock 
market activity -- is positively and significantly related to economic growth in the international cross-
section of countries (Table VI).
17  Indeed, the only financial development indicator that is not 
significantly related to growth is FINANCE-SIZE, which measures financial size.  This result is 
consistent with the Levine and Zervos (1998) result that market capitalization is not a robust predictor of 
economic growth.  They show that stock market liquidity, as measured by the total value traded ratio, and 
banking sector activity, as measured by bank credit to the private sector are robust predictors of growth. 
Thus, the Table VI results are consistent with the financial services and law and finance views.  While 
they are also consistent with both the market-based and bank-based views of financial development, these 
views of financial structure did not fair very well in the specific examination of financial structure.    20
Moreover, all of the overall financial development indicators continue to enter significantly in the simple 
growth regressions when controlling for financial structure. 
  These findings are consistent with the financial services view of financial structure and the 
coefficients suggest an economically large relationship between finance and growth.  To illustrate the 
economic size of the coefficients in Table VI consider FINANCE-ACTIVITY, the overall financial 
activity measure, and its estimated coefficient of 0.435 in the full conditioning information set regression.  
Now consider changing Peru and Argentina’s levels of overall financial activity from –6.6 and –6.0 
respectively to the level of their neighbor Chile, which has a value of FINANCE-ACTIVITY of –4.0 over 
the 1980-95 period.  The estimates suggest an increase in real per capital GDP growth of 1.15 percentage 
points for Peru and 0.89 percentage points in Argentina. This increase in growth is large.  Over this 
period, Peru shrank at a rate of –1.8 percent per year while Argentina stagnated with an annual growth 
rate of 0.04 percent.  Chile, however, might also strive for greater financial development.  For instance, 
Thailand, which has similar real per capita GDP, has an overall financial sector activity index of –2.0, 
compared to Chile’s value of –4.0 for FINANCE-ACTIVITY.  If Chile had enjoyed Thailand’s level of 
financial activity during this 15-year period, the coefficient estimates suggest that Chile would have 
grown 0.86 percentage points faster each year (Chile’s real per capita annual growth over the period 
averaged 3.7 percent).  These examples are meant to illustrate the economic size of the coefficients and 
should not be viewed as exploitable elasticities.  Nonetheless, the results indicate that the economic 
relationship between overall financial sector development and long-run growth is economically relevant. 
C.  The Law and finance View  
  Table I5 provides information on a special case of the financial services view: the law and finance 
view of financial structure.  Here I use instrumental variables to extract that part of overall financial 
development determined by the legal environment.  Specifically, I identify that component of financial 
development determined by (i) legal codes that support shareholders, (ii) legal codes that support 
creditors, and (iii) the efficiency with which law are enforced.  I then assess whether this component of 
overall financial development is strongly linked with long-run growth.   21
It is worth pointing out the desirability of using these legal indicators. Using a variety of 
econometric methods, earlier studies show that the exogenous component of financial development is 
positively linked with growth.
18  Thus, while economic activity may influence financial development, the 
strong, positive link between financial development and growth is not fully explained by reverse 
causality: there is an exogenous component of financial development that positively influences growth.  
While these earlier studies were primarily interested in confronting the issue of exogeneity, the current 
study is primarily interested in assessing the law and finance view: Is that part of overall financial 
development defined by legal codes and enforcement capabilities helpful in explaining cross-country 
growth differences?  Thus, we use measures of the rights of investors and the efficiency of contract 
enforcement.  This may raise concerns that growth alters laws and enforcement.  This is not a dominant 
influence, however.   Levine (1999) uses the legal origin of each country as an instrumental variable in 
extracting the exogenous component of financial development.  LLSV (1998) argue that legal origins –
French, English, German, or Scandinavian legal origin – were determined centuries earlier and were 
largely disseminated through conquest and colonization, so they can be treated as reasonably exogenous 
for current analyses.  These legal origin variables explain differences in legal codes and enforcement 
efficiency.  Critically, this paper’s conclusions hold even when using legal origin as instrumental 
variables.  Thus, I focus on using legal codes and law enforcement to extract this component of overall 
financial development, rather than replicating past work. 
  The results are consistent with the law and finance view: greater financial development, as 
defined by the legal environment, is positively related to economic growth (Table VII).  Furthermore, the 
regressions pass the test of the overidentifying restrictions.  That is, the data do not reject the hypothesis 
that shareholder rights, creditor rights, and the law and order tradition of the country influence growth 
only through their effects on financial development.  Thus, the data are consistent with the view that the 
component of overall financial development explained by legal codes and enforcement efficiency is 
positively and significantly related to economic growth.  Also, the instruments explain a significant 
amount of the cross-sectional variation in financial development in the first-stage regressions.
19  Finally,   22
the coefficient sizes do not shrink from the OLS regressions presented in Table VI.  The economic impact 
of the exogenous component of financial sector development is economically large. 
D. Discussion 
The results provide strong support for the financial services view: overall financial development 
is strongly associated with growth.  This close relationship holds after controlling for potential 
simultaneity bias, omitted variable bias, and wide range of sensitivity checks.  Furthermore, while overall 
financial development is closely associated with economic growth, the degree to which financial structure 
is bank-based or market-based is not associated with growth.  These findings are consistent with the 
financial services view. 
Furthermore, the data support a special case of the financial services view of financial structure: 
the law and finance view.  While the results on the law and finance view must be viewed cautiously, some 
additional information supports the law and finance view.  In terms of caution, to derive conclusions 
about the law and finance view of financial structure from Table VII, one must interpret the results as 
supporting the contention that the component of financial development determined by specific legal 
variables is positively and significantly linked with growth.  Although this is consistent with the results, 
this interpretation is inherently a structural statement.  Nonetheless, it is important to highlight three 
pieces of information. First, as noted above, the three legal system variables jointly explain cross-country 
variation in the overall financial development indicators.  Thus, the results accord with LLSV (1998) 
view that legal system differences account for differences in financial development.  Second, the three 
legal system variables jointly explain economic growth.  Specifically, when the three legal system 
variables are entered jointly in the full conditioning information set growth regression -- while excluding 
the financial development measures, an F-test on the three legal variables shows that they explain a 
significant proportion of the cross-country variation in economic growth.
20  Third, I enter the three legal 
system variables in the growth regression along with the financial development indicator.  The legal 
variables do not enter significantly when controlling for overall financial development.
 21  This suggests   23
that it is the ability of the legal variables to explain cross-country differences in financial development 
that is crucial for growth. This is exactly the law and finance view of financial structure. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper explores the relationship between economic performance and financial structure – the 
degree to which a country’s financial system is market-based or bank-based.  In particular, this paper 
empirically assesses competing theoretical views of financial structure and economic growth.  The bank-
based view holds that bank-based systems – particularly at early stages of economic development and in 
weak institutional settings – do a better job than market-based financial system at mobilizing savings, 
allocating capital and exerting corporate control.  In contrast, the market-based view emphasizes that 
markets provide key financial services that stimulate innovation and long-run growth.  Alternatively, the 
financial services view stresses the role of bank and markets in researching firms, exerting corporate 
control, creating risk management devices, and mobilizing society’s savings for the most productive 
endeavors.  This view minimizes the bank-based versus market-based debate and emphasizes the quality 
of financial services produced by the entire financial system. The law and finance view, which is a special 
case of the financial services view, argues that the legal system is the primary determinant of financial 
development.  Thus, the law and finance view stresses the role of the legal system in boosting overall 
financial sector development and hence long-run growth. 
The data provide no evidence for the bank-based or market based views.  Distinguishing 
countries by financial structure does not help in explaining cross-country differences in long-run 
economic performance. Rather, the cross-country data strongly support the financial services view.  
Distinguishing countries by their overall level of financial development helps to explain cross-country 
difference in economic growth.  Countries with greater degrees of financial development – as measured 
by aggregate measures of bank development and market development – enjoy substantially greater 
economic growth rates.  Moreover, the component of financial development explained by the legal rights 
of outside investors and the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing those rights is strongly and   24
positively linked with long-run growth.  The data are consistent with the view that the legal system 
importantly influences financial sector development and this in turn influences long-run growth.     25
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1 1   A Al ll le en n   a an nd d   G Ga al le e   ( (1 19 99 99 9) )   c co om mp pr re eh he en ns si iv ve el ly y   r re ev vi ie ew w   t th he e   v va as st t   l li it te er ra at tu ur re e   o on n   c co om mp pa ar ra at ti iv ve e   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   
s sy ys st te em ms s. .   
2 2   S Se ee e   G Go ol ld ds sm mi it th h   ( (1 19 96 69 9) ), ,   H Ho os sh hi i, ,   K Ka as sh hy ya ap p, ,   a an nd d   S Sc ch ha ar rf fs st te ei in n   ( (1 19 99 91 1) ), ,   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 97 7) ), ,   M Mo or rk k   a an nd d   
N Na ak kk ka am mu ur ra a   ( (1 19 99 99 9) ), ,   W We ei in ns st te ei in n   a an nd d   Y Ya af fe eh h   ( (1 19 99 98 8) )   a an nd d   W We en ng ge er r   a an nd d   K Ka as se er re er r   ( (1 19 99 98 8) ). .   
3 3   B Bh ha at tt ta ac ch ha ar ry ya a   a an nd d   C Ch hi ie es sa a   ( (1 19 99 95 5) ), ,   D De ew wa at tr ri ip po on nt t   a an nd d   M Ma as sk ki in n   ( (1 19 99 95 5) ), ,   a an nd d   v vo on n   T Th ha ad dd de en n   ( (1 19 99 95 5) )   
e ex xa am mi in ne e   t th he e   a al ll lo oc ca at ti iv ve e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y   o of f   b ba an nk k- -b ba as se ed d   a an nd d   m ma ar rk ke et t- -b ba as se ed d   s sy ys st te em ms s. .      B Bo oo ot t   a an nd d   T Th ha ak ko or r   
( (2 20 00 00 0) )   e ex xp pl lo or re e   t th he e   i im mp pa ac ct t   o of f   m ma ar rk ke et ts s   o on n   b ba an nk ks s. .      F Fo or r   a ad dd di it ti io on na al l   c ci it ta at ti io on ns s   a an nd d   d di is sc cu us ss si io on n   o on n   t th he e   r ro ol le e   
o of f   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s sy ys st te em ms s   i in n   e ec co on no om mi ic c   g gr ro ow wt th h, ,   s se ee e   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 97 7) ). .   
4 4   B Bl la ac ck k   a an nd d   M Mo oe er rs sc ch h   ( (1 19 99 98 8a a) )   s st ta ar rt t   d do ow wn n   t th hi is s   p pa at th h   b by y   e ex xa am mi in ni in ng g   O OE EC CD D   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s. .   
5 5   G Go ol ld ds sm mi it th h   ( (1 19 96 69 9) )   m ma ad de e   t th hi is s   a ar rg gu um me en nt t   w wh he en n   d di is sc cu us ss si in ng g   G Ge er rm ma an ny y’ ’s s   b ba an nk k- -b ba as se ed d   s sy ys st te em m   a an nd d   t th he e   
U Un ni it te ed d   K Ki in ng gd do om m’ ’s s   m ma ar rk ke et t- -b ba as se ed d   s sy ys st te em m   d du ur ri in ng g   t th he e   p pe er ri io od d   1 18 86 64 4- -1 19 91 14 4: :   “ “O On ne e   c ca an nn no ot t   w we el ll l   c cl la ai im m   t th ha at t   
a a   s su up pe er ri io or ri it ty y   i in n   t th he e   G Ge er rm ma an n   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   w wa as s   r re es sp po on ns si ib bl le e   f fo or r, ,   o or r   e ev ve en n   c co on nt tr ri ib bu ut te ed d   t to o, ,   a a   m mo or re e   
r ra ap pi id d   g gr ro ow wt th h   o of f   t th he e   G Ge er rm ma an n   e ec co on no om my y   a as s   a a   w wh ho ol le e   c co om mp pa ar re ed d   t to o   t th he e   B Br ri it ti is sh h   e ec co on no om my y   i in n   t th he e   h ha al lf f- -
c ce en nt tu ur ry y   b be ef fo or re e   W Wo or rl ld d   W Wa ar r   I I, ,   s si in nc ce e   t th he er re e   w wa as s   n no ot t   s si ig gn ni if fi ic ca an nt t   d di if ff fe er re en nc ce e   i in n   t th he e   r ra at te e   o of f   g gr ro ow wt th h   o of f   t th he e   
t tw wo o   e ec co on no om mi ie es s. .” ”   ( (p p. .   4 40 07 7) )   
6 6   B Ba ar rt th h, ,   C Ca ap pr ri io o, ,   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (2 20 00 01 1a a) )   e ex xa am mi in ne e   t th he e   l li in nk ks s   b be et tw we ee en n   b ba an nk k   p pe er rf fo or rm ma an nc ce e   a an nd d   r re eg gu ul la at to or ry y   
p po ow we er rs s. .      B Ba ar rt th h, ,   C Ca ap pr ri io o, ,   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (2 20 00 01 1b b, ,c c) )   p pr re es se en nt t   a a   n ne ew w   d da at ta a   s se et t   o of f   b ba an nk k   r re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   a an nd d   
s su up pe er rv vi is si io on n   a an nd d   t th he en n   u us se e   t th he es se e   d da at ta a   t to o   e ex xa am mi in ne e   t th he e   r re el la at ti io on ns sh hi ip p   b be et tw we ee en n   t th he e   r re eg gu ul la at to or ry y   a an nd d   
s su up pe er rv vi is so or ry y   r re eg gi im me e   a an nd d   b bo ot th h   b ba an nk k   p pe er rf fo or rm ma an nc ce e   a an nd d   s st ta ab bi il li it ty y. .      F Fo or r   a a   h he el lp pf fu ul l   r re ev vi ie ew w   o of f   t th he e   e ec co on no om mi ic cs s   
o of f   b ba an nk k   r re eg gu ul la at ti io on n, ,   s se ee e   B Bh ha at tt ta ac ch ha ar ry ya a, ,   B Bo oo ot t, ,   a an nd d   T Th ha ak ko or r   ( (1 19 99 98 8) ). .   
7 7   T Th he e   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   w wi it th h   b be el lo ow w   m me ed di ia an n   v va al lu ue es s   o of f   b ba an nk k   c cr re ed di it t, ,   m ma ar rk ke et t   c ca ap pi it ta al li iz za at ti io on n, ,   t to ot ta al l   v va al lu ue e   t tr ra ad de ed d   
a an nd d   a ab bo ov ve e   m me ed di ia an n   v va al lu ue es s   o of f   o ov ve er rh he ea ad d   c co os st ts s   a ar re e   A Ar rg ge en nt ti in na a, ,   C Co ol lo om mb bi ia a, ,   E Ec cu ua ad do or r, ,   G Gh ha an na a, ,   G Gr re ee ec ce e, ,   
H Ho on nd du ur ra as s, ,   K Ke en ny ya a, ,   P Pe er ru u, ,   S Sr ri i   L La an nk ka a, ,   T Tr ri in ni id da ad d   a an nd d   T To ob ba ag go o, ,   a an nd d   Z Zi im mb ba ab bw we e. .     1
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 8   F Fu ur rt th he er rm mo or re e, ,   I I   e ex xa am mi in ne ed d   “ “u un nb ba al la an nc ce ed d   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s sy ys st te em ms s. .” ”      C Co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   w wi it th h   w we el ll l- -d de ev ve el lo op pe ed d   b ba an nk ks s   
a an nd d   p po oo or rl ly y   d de ev ve el lo op pe ed d   m ma ar rk ke et ts s, ,   o or r   v vi ic ce e- -v ve er rs sa a, ,   m ma ay y   h ha av ve e   d di is st to or rt te ed d   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re es s   t th ha at t   h hi in nd de er r   t th he e   
e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nt t   p pr ro ov vi is si io on n   o of f   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s se er rv vi ic ce es s. .      H Ho ow we ev ve er r, ,   i id de en nt ti if fy yi in ng g   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   w wi it th h   v ve er ry y   u un nb ba al la an nc ce ed d   
f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s sy ys st te em ms s   d do oe es s   n no ot t   h he el lp p   e ex xp pl la ai in n   g gr ro ow wt th h. .   
9 9   R Re ec ce en nt t   w wo or rk k   s st tr re es ss se es s   t th ha at t   r re el li ig gi io ou us s   c co om mp po os si it ti io on n   a an nd d   g ge eo og gr ra ap ph hi ic ca al l   e en nd do ow wm me en nt ts s   ( (s su uc ch h   a as s   d di is st ta an nc ce e   
f fr ro om m   t th he e   e eq qu ua at to or r) )   i in nf fl lu ue en nc ce e   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t. .      W Wh he en n   c co on nt tr ro ol ll li in ng g   f fo or r   t th he es se e   f fa ac ct to or rs s, ,   t th he e   r re es su ul lt ts s   
o on n   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   r re ep po or rt te ed d   b be el lo ow w   a ar re e   u un na al lt te er re ed d. .   
1 10 0   I I   t te es st te ed d   r ro ob bu us st tn ne es ss s   u us si in ng g   a an n   a ar rr ra ay y   o of f   d di if ff fe er re en nt t   i in nd di ic ca at to or rs s   o of f   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e. .         S Sp pe ec ci if fi ic ca al ll ly y, ,   
i in ns st te ea ad d   o of f   u us si in ng g   t to ot ta al l   v va al lu ue e   t tr ra ad de ed d   o of f   e eq qu ui it ty y   s sh ha ar re es s   r re el la at ti iv ve e   t to o   G GD DP P   t to o   m me ea as su ur re e   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et ts s   
d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t, ,   I I   u us se ed d   t to ot ta al l   v va al lu ue e   t tr ra ad de ed d   r re el la at ti iv ve e   t to o   m ma ar rk ke et t   c ca ap pi it ta al li iz za at ti io on n. .   T Th he e   r re es su ul lt ts s   a ar re e   t th he e   s sa am me e. .      
T Th he en n, ,   i in ns st te ea ad d   o of f   u us si in ng g   s se ec co on nd da ar ry y   m ma ar rk ke et t   m me ea as su ur re es s   o of f   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et t   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t, ,   I I   u us se ed d   p pr ri im ma ar ry y   
m ma ar rk ke et t   m me ea as su ur re es s. .      T Th hu us s, ,   I I   c co om mp pu ut te ed d   t th he e   a am mo ou un nt t   o of f   m mo on ne ey y   o ob bt ta ai in ne ed d   b by y   t th he e   i is ss su ua an nc ce e   o of f   e eq qu ui it ty y   a an nd d   
u us se ed d   t th hi is s   a as s   t th he e   i in nd di ic ca at to or r   o of f   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et t   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t. .   A Ag ga ai in n, ,   t th he e   r re es su ul lt ts s   a ar re e   t th he e   s sa am me e. .      A Al ls so o, ,   I I   u us se ed d   
e ex xp pa an nd de ed d   m me ea as su ur re es s   o of f   b ba an nk ki in ng g   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   t th ha at t   i in nc cl lu ud de e   m me ea as su ur re es s   o of f   p pr ri iv va at te el ly y   o ow wn ne ed d   l li if fe e   i in ns su ur ra an nc ce e   
c co om mp pa an ni ie es s   a an nd d   p pr ri iv va at te e   p pe en ns si io on n   f fu un nd ds s. .      T Th he e   c co on nc cl lu us si io on ns s   a ar re e   t th he e   s sa am me e. .      A Al ls so o, ,   c co on nt tr ro ol ll li in ng g   f fo or r   t th he e   
e ex xt te en nt t   o of f   p pu ub bl li ic c   o ow wn ne er rs sh hi ip p   o of f   b ba an nk ks s   d do oe es s   n no ot t   c ch ha an ng ge e   t th he e   f fi in nd di in ng gs s. .      F Fi in na al ll ly y, ,   I I   u us se ed d   t th he e   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e- -
a ag gg gr re eg ga at te e   i in nd di ic ca at to or r   t to o   c co om mp pu ut te e   a a   z ze er ro o- -o on ne e   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e- -d du um mm my y   v va ar ri ia ab bl le e   o of f   w wh he et th he er r   e ea ac ch h   c co ou un nt tr ry y’ ’s s   
f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s sy ys st te em m   i is s   b ba an nk k- -b ba as se ed d   o or r   m ma ar rk ke et t- -b ba as se ed d   a an nd d   g ge et t   t th he e   s sa am me e   r re es su ul lt ts s. .   
1 11 1   I I   a as ss se es ss se ed d   t th he e   e em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   l li in nk k   b be et tw we ee en n   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   a an nd d   t th he e   i in nd di iv vi id du ua al l   s so ou ur rc ce es s   o of f   g gr ro ow wt th h: :   
t to ot ta al l   f fa ac ct to or r   p pr ro od du uc ct ti iv vi it ty y   g gr ro ow wt th h, ,   p ph hy ys si ic ca al l   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ac cc cu um mu ul la at ti io on n, ,   a an nd d   p pr ri iv va at te e   s sa av vi in ng g   r ra at te es s   u us si in ng g   d da at ta a   
f fr ro om m   E Ea as st te er rl ly y   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (2 20 00 01 1) ). .      S So om me e   m mo od de el ls s, ,   f fo or r   i in ns st ta an nc ce e, ,   s su ug gg ge es st t   t th ha at t   b ba an nk k- -b ba as se ed d   s sy ys st te em ms s   a ar re e   
p pa ar rt ti ic cu ul la ar rl ly y   i im mp po or rt ta an nt t   f fo or r   c ca ap pi it ta al l- -b ba as se ed d   g gr ro ow wt th h, ,   w wh hi il le e   m ma ar rk ke et t- -b ba as se ed d   s sy ys st te em m   a ar re e   c cr ru uc ci ia al l   f fo or r   
i in nn no ov va at ti io on n   l le ed d   g gr ro ow wt th h   ( (A Al ll le en n   a an nd d   G Ga al le e, ,   1 19 99 99 9) ). .      T Th he er re e   i is s   n no ot t   a a   s si ig gn ni if fi ic ca an nt t   l li in nk k   – –   p po os si it ti iv ve e   o or r   n ne eg ga at ti iv ve e     2
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
– –   b be et tw we ee en n   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   a an nd d   a an ny y   o of f   t th he e   s so ou ur rc ce es s   o of f   e ec co on no om mi ic c   g gr ro ow wt th h. .      A Al ls so o, ,   W Wu ur rg gl le er r   ( (2 20 00 00 0) )   
m me ea as su ur re es s   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nt t   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a al ll lo oc ca at ti io on n   a as s   t th he e   d de eg gr re ee e   t to o   w wh hi ic ch h   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fl lo ow ws s   i in nt to o   i in nd du us st tr ri ie es s   w wi it th h   
g gr ro ow wi in ng g   v va al lu ue e   a ad dd de ed d   a an nd d   o ou ut t   o of f   i in nd du us st tr ri ie es s   w wi it th h   d de ec cl li in ni in ng g   v va al lu ue e   a ad dd de ed d. .      I I   f fo ou un nd d   t th ha at t   t th he e   d de eg gr re ee e   t to o   
w wh hi ic ch h   a an n   e ec co on no om my y   h ha as s   a a   b ba an nk k- -b ba as se ed d   o or r   m ma ar rk ke et t- -b ba as se ed d   s sy ys st te em m   i is s   u un nr re el la at te ed d   t to o   W Wu ur rl lg ge er r’ ’s s   ( (2 20 00 00 0) )   
m me ea as su ur re e   o of f   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nt t   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a al ll lo oc ca at ti io on n. .   
1 12 2   S Sp pe ec ci if fi ic ca al ll ly y, ,   f fo or r   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er r   r ri ig gh ht ts s, ,   I I   a ad dd d   1 1   i if f: :   ( (1 1) )   t th he e   c co ou un nt tr ry y   a al ll lo ow ws s   t th he e   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er rs s   t to o   m ma ai il l   t th he ei ir r   
p pr ro ox xy y   t to o   t th he e   f fi ir rm m; ;   ( (2 2) )   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er rs s   a ar re e   n no ot t   r re eq qu ui ir re ed d   t to o   d de ep po os si it t   t th he ei ir r   s sh ha ar re es s   p pr ri io or r   t to o   t th he e   G Ge en ne er ra al l   
S Sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er rs s’ ’   M Me ee et ti in ng g; ;   ( (3 3) )   c cu um mu ul la at ti iv ve e   v vo ot ti in ng g   o or r   p pr ro op po or rt ti io on na al l   r re ep pr re es se en nt ta at ti io on n   o of f   m mi in no or ri it ti ie es s   i in n   t th he e   
b bo oa ar rd d   o of f   d di ir re ec ct to or rs s   i is s   a al ll lo ow we ed d; ;   ( (4 4) )   a an n   o op pp pr re es ss se ed d   m mi in no or ri it ti ie es s   m me ec ch ha an ni is sm m   i is s   i in n   p pl la ac ce e; ;   ( (5 5) )   t th he e   m mi in ni im mu um m   
p pe er rc ce en nt ta ag ge e   o of f   s sh ha ar re e   c ca ap pi it ta al l   t th ha at t   e en nt ti it tl le es s   a a   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er r   t to o   c ca al ll l   f fo or r   a an n   E Ex xt tr ra ao or rd di in na ar ry y   S Sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er rs s’ ’   
M Me ee et ti in ng g   i is s   l le es ss s   t th ha an n   o or r   e eq qu ua al l   t to o   1 10 0   p pe er rc ce en nt t   ( (t th he e   s sa am mp pl le e   m me ed di ia an n) ); ;   o or r   ( (6 6) )   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er rs s   h ha av ve e   
p pr re ee em mp pt ti iv ve e   r ri ig gh ht ts s   t th ha at t   c ca an n   o on nl ly y   b be e   w wa ai iv ve ed d   b by y   a a   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er rs s’ ’   v vo ot te e. .   
1 13 3   L LA AW W   r ra an ng ge es s   f fr ro om m   1 10 0   ( (s st tr ro on ng g   l la aw w   a an nd d   o or rd de er r   t tr ra ad di it ti io on n) )   t to o   1 1   ( (w we ea ak k   l la aw w   a an nd d   o or rd de er r   t tr ra ad di it ti io on n) ). .      T Th he e   
d da at ta a   a ar re e   a av ve er ra ag ge ed d   o ov ve er r   t th he e   p pe er ri io od d   1 19 98 82 2- -9 95 5. .   L LA AW W   i is s   v ve er ry y   h hi ig gh hl ly y   c co or rr re el la at te ed d   w wi it th h   i in nd de ex xe es s   o of f   t th he e   
s se ec cu ur ri it ty y   o of f   p pr ro op pe er rt ty y   r ri ig gh ht ts s   a an nd d   t th he e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y   o of f   c co on nt tr ra ac ct t   e en nf fo or rc ce em me en nt t. .      U Us si in ng g   t th he es se e   a al lt te er rn na at ti iv ve e   
m me ea as su ur re es s   o of f   l le eg ga al l   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   d do oe es s   n no ot t   a al lt te er r   t th he e   c co on nc cl lu us si io on ns s. .   
1 14 4   S Sp pe ec ci if fi ic ca al ll ly y, ,   f fo or r   c cr re ed di it to or r   r ri ig gh ht ts s   I I   a ad dd d   o on ne e   i if f   ( (1 1) )   t th he e   c co ou un nt tr ry y   i im mp po os se es s   r re es st tr ri ic ct ti io on ns s, ,   s su uc ch h   a as s   c cr re ed di it to or rs s’ ’   
c co on ns se en nt t, ,   t to o   f fi il le e   f fo or r   r re eo or rg ga an ni iz za at ti io on n; ;   ( (2 2) )   s se ec cu ur re ed d   c cr re ed di it to or rs s   a ar re e   a ab bl le e   t to o   g ga ai in n   p po os ss se es ss si io on n   o of f   t th he ei ir r   s se ec cu ur ri it ty y   
o on nc ce e   t th he e   r re eo or rg ga an ni iz za at ti io on n   p pe et ti it ti io on n   h ha as s   b be ee en n   a ap pp pr ro ov ve ed d   ( (n no o   a au ut to om ma at ti ic c   s st ta ay y) ); ;   ( (3 3) )   s se ec cu ur re ed d   c cr re ed di it to or rs s   a ar re e   
r ra an nk ke ed d   f fi ir rs st t   i in n   t th he e   d di is st tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   p pr ro oc ce ee ed ds s   t th ha at t   r re es su ul lt t   f fr ro om m   t th he e   d di is sp po os si it ti io on n   o of f   a as ss se et ts s   o of f   a a   b ba an nk kr ru up pt t   
f fi ir rm m; ;   a an nd d   ( (4 4) )   t th he e   d de eb bt to or r   d do oe es s   n no ot t   r re et ta ai in n   t th he e   a ad dm mi in ni is st tr ra at ti io on n   o of f   i it ts s   p pr ro op pe er rt ty y   p pe en nd di in ng g   t th he e   r re es so ol lu ut ti io on n   o of f   
t th he e   r re eo or rg ga an ni iz za at ti io on n. .     3
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 15 5   F Fu ur rt th he er rm mo or re e, ,   I I   a as ss se es ss s   w wh he et th he er r   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   m me ea as su ur re ed d   i in n   1 19 98 80 0   e ex xp pl la ai in ns s   s su ub bs se eq qu ue en nt t   g gr ro ow wt th h. .      
I It t   d do oe es s   n no ot t. .   
1 16 6   I I   h ha av ve e   a al ls so o   e ex xa am mi in ne ed d   t th he e   l li in nk ks s   b be et tw we ee en n   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   a an nd d   b bo ot th h   o ou ut tp pu ut t   v vo ol la at ti il li it ty y   a an nd d   b ba an nk ki in ng g   
s se ec ct to or r   c cr ri is se es s. .      F Fi in na an nc ci ia al l   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   i is s   n no ot t   r re el la at te ed d   t to o   t th he e   p pr ro ob ba ab bi il li it ty y   o of f   s su uf ff fe er ri in ng g   a a   m ma aj jo or r   b ba an nk ki in ng g   c cr ri is si is s, ,   
o or r   t to o   o ou ut tp pu ut t   g gr ro ow wt th h   v vo ol la at ti il li it ty y. .      T Th hu us s, ,   d di is st ti in ng gu ui is sh hi in ng g   b be et tw we ee en n   b ba an nk k- -b ba as se ed d   a an nd d   m ma ar rk ke et t- -b ba as se ed d   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   
s sy ys st te em ms s   i is s   n no ot t   p pa ar rt ti ic cu ul la ar rl ly y   u us se ef fu ul l   f fo or r   u un nd de er rs st ta an nd di in ng g   l lo on ng g- -r ru un n   g gr ro ow wt th h, ,   o ou ut tp pu ut t   v vo ol la at ti il li it ty y, ,   o or r   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   
f fr ra ag gi il li it ty y. .   
1 17 7   I I   a al ls so o   c co on nf fi ir rm m   e ea ar rl li ie er r   f fi in nd di in ng gs s   b by y   K Ki in ng g   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 93 3a a, ,b b) ), ,   L Le ev vi in ne e   a an nd d   Z Ze er rv vo os s   ( (1 19 99 98 8) ), ,   a an nd d   
B Be ec ck k, ,   L Le ev vi in ne e, ,   a an nd d   L Lo oa ay yz za a   ( (2 20 00 00 0) )   u us si in ng g   t th hi is s   p pa ap pe er r’ ’s s   n ne ew w   o ov ve er ra al ll l   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   i in nd di ic ca at to or rs s: :   
f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   i is s   c cl lo os se el ly y   l li in nk ke ed d   w wi it th h   t to ot ta al l   f fa ac ct to or r   p pr ro od du uc ct ti iv vi it ty y   g gr ro ow wt th h   b bu ut t   n no ot t   r ro ob bu us st tl ly y   l li in nk ke ed d   
w wi it th h   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ac cc cu um mu ul la at ti io on n   o or r   p pr ri iv va at te e   s sa av vi in ng g   r ra at te es s. .   
1 18 8   S Se ee e   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 99 9) )   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e, ,   L Lo oa ay yz za a, ,   a an nd d   B Be ec ck k   ( (2 20 00 00 0) ). .   
1 19 9      F Fo or r   i in ns st ta an nc ce e, ,   t th he e   i in ns st tr ru um me en nt ts s   a ar re e   j jo oi in nt tl ly y   s si ig gn ni if fi ic ca an nt t   i in n   t th he e   F FI IN NA AN NC CE E- -A AC CT TI IV VI IT TY Y   f fi ir rs st t- -s st ta ag ge e   
r re eg gr re es ss si io on n   a at t   t th he e   0 0. .0 01 1   l le ev ve el l   a an nd d   a ac cc co ou un nt t   f fo or r   5 50 0   p pe er rc ce en nt t   o of f   i it ts s   c cr ro os ss s- -c co ou un nt tr ry y   v va ar ri ia an nc ce e. .   
2 20 0   S Sp pe ec ci if fi ic ca al ll ly y, ,   t th he e   F F- -s st ta at ti is st ti ic c   e eq qu ua al ls s   3 3. .0 01 1   w wi it th h   a a   P P- -v va al lu ue e   o of f   0 0. .0 04 48 8. .   
2 21 1   S Sp pe ec ci if fi ic ca al ll ly y, ,   t th he e   P P- -v va al lu ue es s   o on n   t th he e   F F- -   s st ta at ti is st ti ic c   ( (w wh he en n   t te es st ti in ng g   t th he e   j jo oi in nt t   s si ig gn ni if fi ic ca an nc ce e   o of f   t th he e   l le eg ga al l   
v va ar ri ia ab bl le es s   w wh hi il le e   c co on nt tr ro ol ll li in ng g   f fo or r   o ov ve er ra al ll l   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t) )   a ar re e   t ty yp pi ic ca al ll ly y   g gr re ea at te er r   t th ha an n   0 0. .4 45 5. .   TABLE I 
Ranked Structure Indices
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
ACTIVITY SIZE EFFICIENCY AGGREGATE REGULATORY
Taiwan 0.59 Ghana 1.34 Switzerland -3.03 Taiwan 1.86 New Zealand 4
Malaysia -0.32 South Africa 0.94 Taiwan -3.62 Malaysia 1.59 Austria 5
Switzerland -0.39 Malaysia 0.60 U.S.A. -4.38 Switzerland 1.58 Germany 5
U.S.A. -0.64 Jamaica 0.08 U.K. -4.79 U.S.A. 1.34 Switzerland 5
Ireland -0.64 Zimbabwe 0.03 Brazil -4.87 U.K. 1.24 United Kingdom 5
Turkey -0.73 U.K. 0.02 Malaysia -4.97 Brazil 1.01 France 6
U.K. -0.74 Mexico -0.02 Israel -5.10 Mexico 0.90 Netherlands 6
Mexico -0.85 New Zealand -0.02 Japan -5.24 Japan 0.86 Argentina 7
Brazil -0.92 Ireland -0.03 Germany -5.26 South Africa 0.85 Canada 7
Thailand -0.92 Chile -0.03 Sweden -5.47 Canada 0.82 Finland 7
Japan -1.00 Canada -0.06 Thailand -5.52 Sweden 0.80 Philippines 7
Canada -1.14 Peru -0.07 Turkey -5.54 Australia 0.80 Spain 7
Israel -1.15 Australia -0.09 Australia -5.58 Israel 0.75 Sri Lanka 7
Sweden -1.18 Philippines -0.10 Canada -5.59 Turkey 0.71 Australia 8
Australia -1.18 U.S.A. -0.11 France -5.60 Thailand 0.68 Cyprus 8
Netherlands -1.36 Sweden -0.15 Mexico -5.75 Philippines 0.58 Denmark 8
Philippines -1.47 Brazil -0.31 South Africa -5.91 New Zealand 0.49 Ireland 8
Germany -1.52 Japan -0.35 Philippines -5.92 Peru 0.39 Norway 8
Peru -1.54 Belgium -0.36 Denmark -6.08 Jamaica 0.38 Panama 8
India -1.61 Sri Lanka -0.39 New Zealand -6.12 Ireland 0.33 Peru 8
New Zealand -1.64 Ecuador -0.43 Jamaica -6.12 Netherlands 0.33 South Africa 8
Denmark -1.87 Kenya -0.48 Spain -6.14 Germany 0.17 Belgium 9
South Africa -1.90 Taiwan -0.53 Netherlands -6.26 Denmark 0.17 Greece 9
Jamaica -2.04 Israel -0.56 Argentina -6.28 Ghana 0.16 Honduras 9
Norway -2.06 Netherlands -0.60 Norway -6.49 India 0.14 Portugal 9
Argentina -2.15 India -0.60 Peru -6.53 Chile 0.00 Sweden 9
Ghana -2.17 Denmark -0.62 Italy -6.54 Ecuador -0.04 Thailand 9
Ecuador -2.19 Thailand -0.66 India -6.58 Belgium -0.17 Trin. & Tob. 9
France -2.28 Switzerland -0.71 Ecuador -6.65 France -0.17 Brazil 10
Honduras -2.34 Turkey -0.74 Chile -6.74 Argentina -0.18 Colombia 10
Spain -2.36 Colombia -0.78 Austria -6.92 Norway -0.23 India 10
Belgium -2.38 Pakistan -0.98 Belgium -6.94 Spain -0.31 Italy 10
Chile -2.46 Trin. & Tob. -1.00 Honduras -7.06 Zimbabwe -0.35 Kenya 10
Pakistan -2.51 Greece -1.02 Finland -7.23 Sri Lanka -0.41 Malaysia 10
Italy -2.52 Argentina -1.09 Cyprus -7.31 Italy -0.55 Pakistan 10
Zimbabwe -2.58 Cyprus -1.11 Sri Lanka -7.37 Pakistan -0.62 Chile 11
Greece -2.65 Norway -1.15 Greece -7.37 Honduras -0.63 Ghana 12
Sri Lanka -2.66 Finland -1.29 Pakistan -7.47 Greece -0.66 Jamaica 12
Finland -2.72 Spain -1.29 Colombia -7.50 Colombia -0.75 Mexico 12
Austria -3.04 France -1.42 Portugal -7.52 Finland -0.76 Taiwan 12
Colombia -3.04 Italy -1.45 Trin. & Tob. -7.72 Trin. & Tob. -1.04 Turkey 12
Portugal -3.40 Honduras -1.46 Zimbabwe -7.88 Cyprus -1.05 United States 12
Trin. & Tob. -3.41 Germany -1.53 Ireland -8.02 Austria -1.27 Egypt 13
Cyprus -3.62 Egypt -1.54 Ghana -8.52 Kenya -1.37 Israel 13
Kenya -3.93 Tunisia -1.91 Kenya -8.88 Portugal -1.43 Japan 13
Egypt -4.14 Panama -1.94 Tunisia -8.90 Egypt -2.09 Zimbabwe 14
Tunisia -4.29 Portugal -2.10 Egypt -9.60 Tunisia -2.09 Ecuador ND
Panama -5.17 Austria -2.46 Panama -9.98 Panama -2.75 Tunisia ND
Notes: 
Structure-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio * overhead costs).
Structure-Aggregate = principal component of Structure 1, 2, 3.
Structure-Regulatory = Index of regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities.TABLE II  
Financial Development
FINANCE FINANCE FINANCE  FINANCE
ACTIVITY SIZE EFFICIENCY AGGREGATE
Switzerland 0.55 Switzerland 5.51 Taiwan 4.43 Switzerland 1.88
Taiwan 0.31 Japan 5.49 Ireland 4.14 Taiwan 1.84
Japan -0.43 South Africa 5.35 Japan 3.32 Japan 1.76
U.S.A. -0.80 U.S.A. 5.24 Malaysia 3.27 Malaysia 1.52
Malaysia -1.08 Malaysia 5.23 Switzerland 2.98 U.S.A. 1.37
U.K. -1.33 Netherlands 5.13 Netherlands 2.95 Netherlands 1.35
Netherlands -1.41 U.K. 5.02 U.K. 2.72 U.K. 1.27
Germany -1.76 Sweden 4.99 Thailand 2.33 Ireland 1.11
Sweden -1.91 Taiwan 4.94 U.S.A. 2.24 Sweden 0.92
Thailand -1.98 Australia 4.82 Germany 1.91 Germany 0.89
Canada -2.14 Canada 4.81 Canada 1.84 Thailand 0.86
Australia -2.14 Germany 4.71 Australia 1.71 Canada 0.86
Ireland -2.41 France 4.71 Sweden 1.49 Australia 0.84
Israel -2.52 Norway 4.64 Israel 1.43 South Africa 0.79
France -2.57 Cyprus 4.57 New Zealand 1.07 Israel 0.51
South Africa -2.81 New Zealand 4.55 Finland 0.98 France 0.50
Norway -2.91 Thailand 4.55 Norway 0.91 Norway 0.47
Spain -3.11 Austria 4.54 South Africa 0.75 New Zealand 0.42
New Zealand -3.14 Chile 4.54 France 0.64 Spain 0.30
Austria -3.36 Spain 4.50 Denmark 0.58 Finland 0.28
Finland -3.52 Ireland 4.49 Spain 0.57 Austria 0.26
Denmark -3.63 Finland 4.45 India 0.52 Chile 0.10
Italy -3.89 Israel 4.37 Austria 0.48 Denmark 0.05
Chile -3.96 Portugal 4.26 Mexico 0.23 Italy -0.09
Brazil -4.14 Tunisia 4.16 Chile 0.20 Belgium -0.16
Philippines -4.17 Denmark 4.16 Belgium 0.19 Portugal -0.17
Portugal -4.32 Belgium 4.14 Italy 0.13 Cyprus -0.21
India -4.35 Italy 4.13 Philippines 0.03 Philippines -0.26
Belgium -4.37 Trin. & Tob. 4.11 Turkey -0.03 India -0.30
Cyprus -4.44 Panama 4.06 Portugal -0.19 Mexico -0.49
Mexico -4.50 Jamaica 3.95 Pakistan -0.45 Brazil -0.53
Turkey -4.77 Philippines 3.91 Brazil -0.62 Jamaica -0.55
Jamaica -4.82 Greece 3.88 Honduras -0.76 Tunisia -0.58
Greece -5.05 Kenya 3.71 Greece -0.92 Greece -0.62
Honduras -5.15 India 3.69 Jamaica -0.96 Trin. & Tob. -0.67
Trin. & Tob. -5.32 Brazil 3.60 Tunisia -1.00 Honduras -0.77
Pakistan -5.41 Zimbabwe 3.56 Cyprus -1.06 Pakistan -0.78
Tunisia -5.52 Honduras 3.52 Sri Lanka -1.26 Turkey -0.81
Ecuador -5.75 Colombia 3.51 Zimbabwe -1.37 Panama -0.95
Sri Lanka -5.97 Egypt 3.50 Trin. & Tob. -1.52 Sri Lanka -1.03
Argentina -5.99 Mexico 3.47 Ecuador -1.52 Zimbabwe -1.04
Zimbabwe -6.14 Pakistan 3.47 Egypt -1.55 Ecuador -1.10
Colombia -6.31 Sri Lanka 3.47 Panama -1.76 Egypt -1.23
Panama -6.55 Ecuador 3.35 Argentina -1.91 Kenya -1.27
Peru -6.60 Turkey 2.99 Peru -2.02 Colombia -1.31
Kenya -6.83 Argentina 2.99 Kenya -2.30 Argentina -1.39
Egypt -6.85 Peru 2.76 Colombia -2.51 Peru -1.62
Ghana -9.07 Ghana 2.73 Ghana -2.71 Ghana -2.20
Notes
Finance-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio * private credit ratio).
Finance-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio + private credit ratio).
Finance-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio / overhead costs).
Finance-Aggregate = Principal component of Finance 1, 2, 3.TABLE III
Correlations of Financial Structure and Financial Development
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE FINANCE FINANCE FINANCE FINANCE
ACTIVITY SIZE EFFICIENCY AGGREGATE REGULATORY ACTIVITY SIZE EFFICIENCY AGGREGATE
STRUCTURE 1.00 0.51** 0.85** 0.96** 0.03 0.69** 0.36** 0.74** 0.63**
ACTIVITY
STRUCTURE 1.00 0.25** 0.65** 0.26* 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.09
SIZE
STRUCTURE 1.00 0.88** -0.14 0.80** 0.53** 0.68** 0.70**
EFFICIENCY
STRUCTURE 1.00 0.04 0.66** 0.40** 0.66** 0.60**
AGGREGATE
STRUCTURE 1.00  -0.26*  -0.30** -0.18  -0.26*
REGULATOR
FINANCE 1.00 0.88** 0.94** 0.98**
ACTIVITY







** indicates significant at the 0.01 level and * indicates signifcant at the 0.05 level
Structure-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio * overhead costs).
Structure-Aggregate = principal component of Structure 1, 2, 3.
Structure-Regulatory = Index of regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities.
Finance-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio * private credit ratio).
Finance-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio + private credit ratio).
Finance-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio / overhead costs).
Finance-Aggregate = Principal component of Finance 1, 2, 3.TABLE IV 
Financial Structure and Economic Growth
Dependent variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth, 1980-95
     
1. Simple Conditioning Information Set
Explanatory coefficient standard t-statistic P-value R-
Variable error Squared
Structure-Activity 0.474 0.285 1.659 0.104 0.086
Structure-Size -0.318 0.350 -0.909 0.368 0.019
Structure-Efficiency 0.373 0.255 1.460 0.151 0.069
Structure-Aggregate 0.365 0.313 1.167 0.250 0.039
Structure-Regulatory 0.118 0.107 1.099 0.278 0.024
2. Full Conditioning Information Set
Explanatory coefficient standard t-statistic P-value R-
Variable error Squared
Structure-Activity 0.455 0.305 1.493 0.145 0.405
Structure-Size -0.605 0.517 -1.170 0.250 0.386
Structure-Efficiency 0.336 0.259 1.299 0.203 0.392
Structure-Aggregate 0.315 0.321 0.982 0.333 0.372
Structure-Regulatory 0.179 0.106 1.687 0.101 0.391
Notes: 
The reported explanatory variables are included one-by-one in the regressions.
Simple conditioning information set: logarithm of initial income and schooling.
Full conditioning information set: simple set, plus inflation, black market premium, government size, 
    trade openness, and indicators of civil liberties, revolutions and coups, political assassinations, 
    bureaucratic efficiency, and corruption.
Structure-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio * overhead costs).
Structure-Aggregate = principal component of Structure 1, 2, 3.
Structure-Regulatory = Index of regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities.TABLE V  
Financial Structure, Interactions with Income and the Legal System, and Growth
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth, 1980-95
1
Structure and Income Per Capita
2 Structure and Shareholder Rights
3 Structure and the Rule of Law
4
Explanatory coefficient P-value Explanatory coefficient P-value Explanatory coefficient P-value
Variable Variable Variable
Structure-Activity 1.910 0.465 Structure-Activity 0.148 0.844 Structure-Activity -0.121 0.811
Structure-Activity*Income -0.172 0.583 Structure-Activity*Rights 0.137 0.561 Structure-Activity*Law 0.130 0.341
Structure-Size -2.102 0.235 Structure-Size -0.439 0.587 Structure-Size -0.895 0.177
Structure-Size*Income 0.215 0.284 Structure-Size*Rights -0.078 0.806 Structure-Size*Law 0.147 0.286
Structure-Efficiency 2.415 0.190 Structure-Efficiency 0.575 0.238 Structure-Efficiency 0.447 0.314
Structure-Efficiency*Income -0.243 0.252 Structure-Efficiency*Rights -0.108 0.515 Structure-Efficiency*Law -0.035 0.757
Structure-Aggregate 0.621 0.237 Structure-Aggregate 0.508 0.519 Structure-Aggregate -0.064 0.905
Structure-Aggregate*Income -0.196 0.595 Structure-Aggregate*Rights -0.077 0.752 Structure-Aggregate*Law 0.089 0.517
Structure-Regulatory -0.257 0.842 Structure-Regulatory -0.226 0.272 Structure-Regulatory -0.215 0.530
Structure-Regulatory*Income 0.043 0.761 Structure-Regulatory*Rights 0.112 0.058 Structure-Regulatory*Law 0.082 0.229
Notes: 
1. Each structure variable and the corresponding interaction term are included in separate regressions.
     Thus, the table summarizes the results of 15  regressions.
2. Structure and income per capita regressions also include the logarithm of initial income and schooling. 
Structure-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio / bank credit ratio).
Structure-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio * overhead costs).
Structure-Aggregate = principal component of Structure 1, 2, 3.
Structure-Regulatory = Index of regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities.
Income = Ln(Real per Capita GDP)
Rights = Index of (equity) shareholder rights.
Law = Index of the degree to which the rule of law holds in a country.
3. Structure and shareholder rights regressions also include the logarithm of initial income and schooling, and Rights (which is an index of (equity) sharehold
legal rights).
4. Structure and rule of law regressions also include the logarithm of initial income and schooling, and Law (which is an index of the degree to which the rule of 
law holds).TABLE VI
Financial Development and Economic Growth
Dependent variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth, 1980-95
     
1. Simple Conditioning Information Set
Explanatory coefficient standard t-statistic P-value R-
Variable error Squared
Finance-Activity 0.645 0.170 3.792 0.001 0.316
Finance-Size 1.374 0.621 2.213 0.032 0.182
Finance-Efficiency 0.722 0.163 4.437 0.000 0.366
Finance-Aggregate 1.340 0.356 3.767 0.001 0.327
2. Full Conditioning Information Set
Explanatory coefficient standard t-statistic P-value R-
Variable error Squared
Finance-Activity 0.435 0.203 2.141 0.039 0.434
Finance-Size 0.371 0.684 0.542 0.591 0.360
Finance-Efficiency 0.527 0.215 2.450 0.019 0.464
Finance-Aggregate 0.897 0.407 2.204 0.034 0.425
Notes: 
The reported explanatory variables are included one-by-one in the regressions.
Simple conditioning information set: logarithm of initial income and schooling.
Full conditioning information set: simple set, plus inflation, black market premium, government size, 
    trade openness, and indicators of civil liberties, revolutions and coups, political assassinations, 
    bureaucratic efficiency, and corruption.
Finance-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio * private credit ratio).
Finance-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio + private credit ratio).
Finance-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio / overhead costs).
Finance-Aggregate = Principal component of Finance 1, 2, 3.TABLE VII
Financial Development and Economic Growth, Instrumental Variables
Dependent variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth, 1980-95
     
1. Simple Conditioning Information Set
Explanatory coefficient standard t-statistic P-value J- 
Variable error Statistic
Finance-Activity 0.858 0.297 2.892 0.006 1.597
Finance-Size 1.704 0.566 3.010 0.005 1.299
Finance-Efficiency 0.876 0.326 2.687 0.011 1.176
Finance-Aggregate 1.418 0.478 2.965 0.005 1.412
2. Full Conditioning Information Set
Explanatory coefficient standard t-statistic P-value J- 
Variable error Statistic
Finance-Activity 1.132 0.518 2.183 0.038 0.311
Finance-Size 3.039 1.372 2.214 0.035 1.183
Finance-Efficiency 0.861 0.311 2.769 0.010 0.561
Finance-Aggregate 1.867 0.730 2.557 0.016 0.617
Notes: 
N*J-Statistic is distributed Chi-Squared with two degrees of freedom.
   At the 10% level, the critical value is 4.61.  At the 5% level, the critical value is 5.99.
The reported explanatory variables are included one-by-one in the regressions.
Simple conditioning information set: logarithm of initial income and schooling.
Full conditioning information set: simple set, plus inflation, black market premium, 
     government size, trade openness, and indicators of civil liberties, revolutions and coups, 
    political assassinations, bureaucratic efficiency, and corruption.
Instruments: creditor rights, shareholder rights, law and order
Finance-Activity = Ln (total value traded ratio * private credit ratio).
Finance-Size = Ln (market capitalization ratio + private credit ratio).
Finance-Efficiency = Ln (total value traded ratio / overhead costs).
Finance-Aggregate = Principal component of Finance 1, 2, 3.